IT is not, my reverend Ambrosius, because we seek after many words—a
thing which is forbidden, and in the indulgence of which it is impossible to
avoid sin (Chapter 1).
For that sensible light of theirs is the work of the Creator of
all things, while that rational light is derived perhaps from the principle of
free-will within them (Chapter 10).
From what has been said, it will be manifest to intelligent hearers
how we have to answer the following: “All the rest of the race will be
completely burnt up, and they alone will remain.” It is not to be wondered at,
indeed, if such thoughts have been entertained by those amongst us who are called
in Scripture the “foolish things” of the world, and “base things,” and “things
which are despised,” and “things which are not,” because “by the foolishness of
preaching it pleased God to save them that believe on Him, after that, in the
wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not God,”—because such individuals are
unable to see distinctly the sense of each particular passage, or unwilling to
devote the necessary leisure to the investigation of Scripture, notwithstanding
the injunction of Jesus, “Search the Scriptures.” The following, moreover, are his
ideas regarding the fire which is to be brought upon the world by God, and the
punishments which are to befall sinners. And perhaps, as it is appropriate to
children that some things should be addressed to them in a manner befitting
their infantile condition, to convert them, as being of very tender age, to a
better course of life; so, to those whom the word terms “the foolish things of the
world,” and “the base,” and “the despised,” the just and obvious meaning of the
passages relating to punishments is suitable, inasmuch as they cannot receive
any other mode of conversion than that which is by fear and the presentation of
punishment, and thus be saved from the many evils (which would befall them). The
Scripture accordingly declares that only those who are unscathed by the fire
and the punishments are to remain,—those, viz., whose opinions, and morals, and
mind have been purified to the highest degree; while, on the other hand, those
of a different nature—those, viz., who, according to their deserts, require the
administration of punishment by fire—will be involved in these sufferings with
a view to an end which it is suitable for God to bring upon those who have been
created in His image, but who have lived in opposition to the will of that
nature which is according to His image. And this is our answer to the
statement, “All the rest of the race will be completely burnt up, but they
alone are to remain” (Chapter 16).
But since he has ridiculed at great length the doctrine of the
resurrection of the flesh, which has been preached in the Churches, and which
is more clearly understood by the more intelligent believer; and as it is
unnecessary again to quote his words, which have been already adduced, let us, with
regard to the problem (as in an apologetic work directed against an alien from
the faith, and for the sake of those who are still “children, tossed to and
fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men, and
cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to deceive”), state and establish
to the best of our ability a few points expressly intended for our readers.
Neither we, then, nor the holy Scriptures, assert that with the same bodies,
without a change to a higher condition, “shall those who were long dead arise
from the earth and live again;” for in so speaking, Celsus makes a false charge
against us. For we may listen to many passages of Scripture treating of the
resurrection in a manner worthy of God, although it may suffice for the present
to quote the language of Paul from the first Epistle to the Corinthians, where
he says: “But some man will say, How are the dead raised up? and with what body
do they come? Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it
die. And that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be, but
bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain; but God giveth it a
body as it hath pleased Him, and to every seed his own body.” Now, observe how
in these words he says that there is sown, “not that body that shall be;” but
that of the body which is sown and cast naked into the earth (God giving to
each seed its own body), there takes place as it were a resurrection: from the
seed that was cast into the ground there arising a stalk, e.g., among such
plants as the following, viz., the mustard plant, or of a larger tree, as in
the olive, or one of the fruit-trees (Chapter 18).
The learned among the Egyptians, moreover, hold similar views, and
yet they are treated with respect, and do not incur the ridicule of Celsus and
such as he; while we, who maintain that all things are administered by God in
proportion to the relation of the free-will of each individual, and are ever
being brought into a better condition, so far as they admit of being so, and
who know that the nature of our free-will admits of the occurrence of
contingent events (for it is incapable of receiving the wholly unchangeable
character of God), yet do not appear to say anything worthy of a testing
examination (Chapter 21).
Let no one, however, suspect that, in speaking as we do, we belong
to those who are indeed called Christians, but who set aside the doctrine of
the resurrection as it is taught in Scripture. For these persons cannot, so far
as their principles apply, at all establish that the stalk or tree which springs
up comes from the grain of wheat, or anything else (which was cast into the
ground); whereas we, who believe that that which is “sown” is not “quickened”
unless it die, and that there is sown not that body that shall be (for God
gives it a body as it pleases Him, raising it in incorruption after it is sown
in corruption; and after it is sown in dishonour, raising it in glory; and
after it is sown in weakness, raising it in power; and after it is sown a
natural body, raising it a spiritual),—we preserve both the doctrine of the
Church of Christ and the grandeur of the divine promise, proving also the
possibility of its accomplishment not by mere assertion, but by arguments; knowing
that although heaven and earth, and the things that are in them, may pass away,
yet His words regarding each individual thing, being, as parts of a whole, or
species of a genus, the utterances of Him who was God the Word, who was in the
beginning with God, shall by no means pass away. For we desire to listen to Him
who said: “Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My words shall not pass away”
(Chapter 22).
We, therefore, do not maintain that the body which has undergone
corruption resumes its original nature, any more than the grain of wheat which
has decayed returns to its former condition. But we do maintain, that as above
the grain of wheat there arises a stalk, so a certain power is implanted in the
body, which is not destroyed, and from which the body is raised up in
incorruption. The philosophers of the Porch, however, in consequence of the
opinions which they hold regarding the unchangeableness of things after a
certain cycle, assert that the body, after undergoing complete corruption, will
return to its original condition, and will again assume that first nature from
which it passed into a state of dissolution, establishing these points, as they
think, by irresistible arguments. We, however, do not betake ourselves to a
most absurd refuge, saying that with God all things are possible; for we
know how to understand this word “all” as not referring either to things that
are “non-existent” or that are inconceivable. But we maintain, at the same
time, that God cannot do what is disgraceful, since then He would be capable of
ceasing to be God; for if He do anything that is disgraceful, He is not God.
Since, however, he lays it down as a principle, that “God does not desire what
is contrary to nature,” we have to make a distinction, and say that if any one
asserts that wickedness is contrary to nature, while we maintain that “God does
not desire what is contrary to nature,”—either what springs from wickedness or
from an irrational principle,—yet, if such things happen according to the word
and will of God, we must at once necessarily hold that they are not contrary to
nature. Therefore things which are done by God, although they may be, or may appear
to some to be incredible, are not contrary to nature. And if we must press
the force of words, we would say that, in comparison with what is generally
understood as “nature,” there are certain things which are beyond its
power, which God could at any time do; as, e.g., in raising man above the level
of human nature, and causing him to pass into a better and more divine
condition, and preserving him in the same, so long as he who is the object of
His care shows by his actions that he desires (the continuance of His help)
(Chapter 23).
Moreover, as we have already said that for God to desire anything
unbecoming Himself would be destructive of His existence as Deity, we will add
that if man, agreeably to the wickedness of his nature, should desire anything
that is abominable, God cannot grant it. And now it is from no spirit of
contention that we answer the assertions of Celsus; but it is in the spirit of
truth that we investigate them, as assenting to his view that “He is the God,
not of inordinate desires, nor of error and disorder, but of a nature just and
upright,” because He is the source of all that is good. And that He is able to
provide an eternal life for the soul we acknowledge; and that He possesses not
only the “power,” but the “will.” In view, therefore, of these considerations,
we are not at all more worthless than dung;” and yet, with reference even to
this, one might say that dung, indeed, ought to be cast out, while the dead
bodies of men, on account of the soul by which they were inhabited, especially
if it had been virtuous, ought not to be cast out. For, in harmony with those laws
which are based upon the principles of equity, bodies are deemed worthy of
sepulture, with the honours accorded on such occasions, that no insult, so far
as can be helped, may be offered to the soul which dwelt within, by casting
forth the body (after the soul has departed) like that of the animals. Let it
not then be held, contrary to reason, that it is the will of God to declare
that the grain of wheat is not immortal, but the stalk which springs from it,
while the body which is sown in corruption is not, but that which is raised by
Him in incorruption. But according to Celsus, God Himself is the reason of all
things, while according to our view it is His Son, of whom we say in philosophic
language, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the
Word was God;” while in our judgment also, God cannot do anything which is
contrary to reason, or contrary to Himself (Chapter 24).
Let us next notice the statements of Celsus, which follow the
preceding, and which are as follow: “As the Jews, then, became a peculiar
people, and enacted laws in keeping with the customs of their country, and
maintain them up to the present time, and observe a mode of worship which, whatever
be its nature, is yet derived from their fathers, they act in these respects
like other men, because each nation retains its ancestral customs, whatever
they are, if they happen to be established among them. And such an arrangement
appears to be advantageous, not only because it has occurred to the mind of
other nations to decide some things differently, but also because it is a duty
to protect what has been established for the public advantage; and also
because, in all probability, the various quarters of the earth were from the beginning
allotted to different superintending spirits, and were thus distributed among
certain governing powers, and in this manner the administration of the world is
carried on. And whatever is done among each nation in this way would be rightly
done, wherever it was agreeable to the wishes (of the superintending powers),
while it would be an act of impiety to get rid of the institutions established
from the beginning in the various places.” By these words Celsus shows that the
Jews, who were formerly Egyptians, subsequently became a “peculiar people,” and
enacted laws which they carefully preserve. And not to repeat his statements,
which have been already before us, he says that it is advantageous to the Jews
to observe their ancestral worship, as other nations carefully attend to
theirs. And he further states a deeper reason why it is of advantage to the
Jews to cultivate their ancestral customs, in hinting dimly that those to whom
was allotted the office of superintending the country which was being legislated
for, enacted the laws of each land in co-operation with its legislators. He
appears, then, to indicate that both the country of the Jews, and the nation
which inhabits it, are superintended by one or more beings, who, whether they
were one or more, co-operated with Moses, and enacted the laws of the Jews
(Chapter 25).
“We must,” he says, “observe the laws, not only because it has
occurred to the mind of others to decide some things differently, but because
it is a duty to protect what has been enacted for the public advantage, and
also because, in all probability, the various quarters of the earth were from the
beginning allotted to different superintending spirits, and were distributed
among certain governing powers, and in this manner the administration of the
world is carried on.” Thus Celsus, as if he had forgotten what he had said
against the Jews, now includes them in the general eulogy which he passes upon
all who observe their ancestral customs, remarking: “And whatever is done among
each nation in this way, would be rightly done whenever agreeable to the wishes
(of the superintendents).” And observe here, whether he does not openly, so far
as he can, express a wish that the Jew should live in the observance of his own
laws, and not depart from them, because he would commit an act of impiety if he
apostatized; for his words are: “It would be an act of impiety to get rid of
the institutions established from the beginning in the various places.” Now I
should like to ask him, and those who entertain his views, who it was that
distributed the various quarters of the earth from the beginning among the
different superintending spirits; and especially, who gave the country of the
Jews, and the Jewish people themselves, to the one or more superintendents to
whom it was allotted? Was it, as Celsus would say, Jupiter who assigned the
Jewish people and their country to a certain spirit or spirits? And was it his
wish, to whom they were thus assigned, to enact among them the laws which
prevail, or was it against his will that it was done? You will observe
that, whatever be his answer, he is in a strait. But if the various quarters of
the earth were not allotted by some one being to the various
superintending spirits, then each one at random, and without the
superintendence of a higher power, divided the earth according to chance; and
yet such a view is absurd, and destructive in no small degree of the providence
of the God who presides over all things (Chapter 26).
Any one, indeed, who chooses, may relate how the various quarters
of the earth, being distributed among certain governing powers, are
administered by those who superintend them; but let him tell us also how what
is done among each nation is done rightly when agreeable to the wishes of the superintendents.
Let him, for example, tell us whether the laws of the Scythians, which permit
the murder of parents, are right laws; or those of the Persians, which do not
forbid the marriages of sons with their mothers, or of daughters with their own
fathers. But what need is there for me to make selections from those who have
been engaged in the business of enacting laws among the different nations, and
to inquire how the laws are rightly enacted among each, according as they please
the superintending powers? Let Celsus, however, tell us how it would be an act
of impiety to get rid of those ancestral laws which permit the marriages of
mothers and daughters; or which pronounce a man happy who puts an end to his
life by hanging, or declare that they undergo entire purification who deliver
themselves over to the fire, and who terminate their existence by fire; and how
it is an act of impiety to do away with those laws which, for example, prevail
in the Tauric Chersonese, regarding the offering up of strangers in sacrifice
to Diana, or among certain of the Libyan tribes regarding the sacrifice of
children to Saturn. Moreover, this inference follows from the dictum of Celsus,
that it is an act of impiety on the part of the Jews to do away with those ancestral
laws which forbid the worship of any other deity than the Creator of all
things. And it will follow, according to his view, that piety is not divine by
its own nature, but by a certain (external) arrangement and appointment. For it
is an act of piety among certain tribes to worship a crocodile, and to eat what
is an object of adoration among other tribes; while, again, with others it is a
pious act to worship a calf, and among others, again, to regard the goat as a
god. And, in this way, the same individual will be regarded as acting piously
according to one set of laws, and impiously according to another; and this is
the most absurd result that can be conceived! (Chapter 27).
It is probable, however, that to such remarks as the above, the
answer returned would be, that he was pious who kept the laws of his own country,
and not at all chargeable with impiety for the non-observance of those of other
lands; and that, again, he who was deemed guilty of impiety among certain
nations was not really so, when he worshipped his own gods, agreeably to his country’s
laws, although he made war against, and even feasted on, those who were
regarded as divinities among those nations which possessed laws of an opposite
kind. Now, observe here whether these statements do not exhibit the greatest
confusion of mind regarding the nature of what is just, and holy, and
religious; since there is no accurate definition laid down of these things, nor
are they described as having a peculiar character of their own, and stamping as
religious those who act according to their injunctions. If, then, religion, and
piety, and righteousness belong to those things which are so only by
comparison, so that the same act may be both pious and impious, according to
different relations and different laws, see whether it will not follow that
temperance also is a thing of comparison, and courage as well, and prudence,
and the other virtues, than which nothing could be more absurd! What we have
said, however, is sufficient for the more general and simple class of answers
to the allegations of Celsus. But as we think it likely that some of those who
are accustomed to deeper investigation will fall in with this treatise, let us
venture to lay down some considerations of a profounder kind, conveying a
mystical and secret view respecting the original distribution of the various
quarters of the earth among different superintending spirits; and let us prove
to the best of our ability, that our doctrine is free from the absurd
consequences enumerated above (Chapter 28).
The remarks which we have made not only answer the statements of
Celsus regarding the superintending spirits, but anticipate in some measure
what he afterwards brings forward, when he says: “Let the second party come
forward; and I shall ask them whence they come, and whom they regard as the
originator of their ancestral customs. They will reply, No one, because they
spring from the same source as the Jews themselves, and derive their
instruction and superintendence from no other quarter, and notwithstanding they
have revolted from the Jews.” Each one of us, then, is come “in the last days,”
when one Jesus has visited us, to the “visible mountain of the Lord,” the Word
that is above every word, and to the “house of God,” which is “the Church of
the living God, the pillar and ground of the truth.” And we notice how it is
built upon “the tops of the mountains,” i.e., the predictions of all the
prophets, which are its foundations. And this house is exalted above the hills,
i.e., those individuals among men who make a profession of superior attainments
in wisdom and truth; and all the nations come to it, and the “many nations” go
forth, and say to one another, turning to the religion which in the last days
has shone forth through Jesus Christ: “Come ye, and let us go up to the
mountain of the LORD, to the house of the God of Jacob; and He will teach us of
His ways, and we will walk in them.” For the law came forth from the dwellers
in Sion, and settled among us as a spiritual law. Moreover, the word of the
Lord came forth from that very Jerusalem, that it might be disseminated through
all places, and might judge in the midst of the heathen, selecting those whom
it sees to be submissive, and rejecting the disobedient, who are many in
number. And to those who inquire of us whence we come, or who is our founder, we
reply that we are come, agreeably to the counsels of Jesus, to “cut down our hostile
and insolent ‘wordy’ swords into ploughshares, and to convert into
pruning-hooks the spears formerly
employed in war.” For we no longer take up “sword against nation,” nor do we “learn
war any more,” having become children of peace, for the sake of Jesus, who is
our leader, instead of those whom our fathers followed, among whom we were “strangers
to the covenant,” and having received a law, for which we give thanks to Him
that rescued us from the error (of our ways), saying, “Our fathers honoured
lying idols, and there is not among them one that causeth it to rain.” Our
Superintendent, then, and Teacher, having come forth from the Jews, regulates
the whole world by the word of His teaching. And having made these remarks by
way of anticipation, we have refuted as well as we could the untrue statements
of Celsus, by subjoining the appropriate answer (Chapter 33).
As there are, then, generally two laws presented to us, the one
being the law of nature, of which God would be the legislator, and the other
being the written law of cities, it is a proper thing, when the written law is
not opposed to that of God, for the citizens not to abandon it under pretext of
foreign customs; but when the law of nature, that is, the law of God, commands
what is opposed to the written law, observe whether reason will not tell us to
bid a long farewell to the written code, and to the desire of its legislators,
and to give ourselves up to the legislator God, and to choose a life agreeable
to His word, although in doing so it may be necessary to encounter dangers, and
countless labours, and even death and dishonour. For when there are some laws
in harmony with the will of God, which are opposed to others which are in force
in cities, and when it is impracticable to please God (and those who administer
laws of the kind referred to), it would be absurd to contemn those acts by
means of which we may please the Creator of all things, and to select those by
which we shall become displeasing to God, though we may satisfy unholy laws,
and those who love them. But since it is reasonable in other matters to prefer
the law of nature, which is the law of God, before the written law, which has
been enacted by men in a spirit of opposition to the law of God, why should we
not do this still more in the case of those laws which relate to God? Neither
shall we, like the Ethiopians who inhabit the parts about Meroe, worship, as is
their pleasure, Jupiter and Bacchus only; nor shall we at all reverence Ethiopian
gods in the Ethiopian manner; nor, like the Arabians, shall we regard Urania
and Bacchus alone as divinities; nor in any degree at all deities in which the
difference of sex has been a ground of distinction (as among the Arabians, who
worship Urania as a female, and Bacchus as a male deity); nor shall we, like
all the Egyptians, regard Osiris and Isis as gods; nor shall we enumerate
Athena among these, as the Saïtes are pleased to do. And if to the ancient
inhabitants of Naucratis it seemed good to worship other divinities, while
their modern descendants have begun quite recently to pay reverence to Serapis,
who never was a god at all, we shall not on that account assert that a new
being who was not formerly a god, nor at all known to men, is a deity. For the
Son of God, “the First-born of all creation,” although He seemed recently to
have become incarnate, is not by any means on that account recent. For the holy
Scriptures know Him to be the most ancient of all the works of creation; for it
was to Him that God said regarding the creation of man, “Let Us make man in Our
image, after Our likeness” (Chapter 37).
You ought to have said that “laws are kings of all men,” for in
every nation some law is king of all. But if you mean that which is law in the
proper sense, then it is this which is by nature “king of all things;” although
there are some individuals who, having like robbers abandoned the law, deny its
validity, and live lives of violence and injustice. We Christians, then, who
have come to the knowledge of the law which is by nature “king of all things,”
and which is the same with the law of God, endeavour to regulate our lives by
its prescriptions, having bidden a long farewell to those of an unholy kind
(Chapter 40).
As Celsus, however, is of opinion that it matters nothing whether
the highest being be called Jupiter, or Zen, or Adonai, or Sabaoth, or Ammoun
(as the Egyptians term him), or Pappæus (as the Scythians entitle him), let us
discuss the point for a little, reminding the reader at the same time of what
has been said above upon this question, when the language of Celsus led us to
consider the subject. And now we maintain that the nature of names is not, as
Aristotle supposes, an enactment of those who impose them. For the languages
which are prevalent among men do not derive their origin from men, as is evident
to those who are able to ascertain the nature of the charms which are
appropriated by the inventors of the languages differently, according to the
various tongues, and to the varying pronunciations of the names, on which we
have spoken briefly in the preceding pages, remarking that when those names
which in a certain language were possessed of a natural power were translated
into another, they were no longer able to accomplish what they did before when
uttered in their native tongues. And the same peculiarity is found to apply to
men; for if we were to translate the name of one who was called from his birth
by a certain appellation in the Greek language into the Egyptian or Roman, or
any other tongue, we could not make him do or suffer the same things which he
would have done or suffered under the appellation first bestowed upon him. Nay,
even if we translated into the Greek language the name of an individual who had
been originally invoked in the Roman tongue, we could not produce the result
which the incantation professed itself capable of accomplishing had it
preserved the name first conferred upon him. And if these statements are true
when spoken of the names of men, what are we to think of those which are
transferred, for any cause whatever, to the Deity? For example,
something is transferred from the name Abraham when translated into Greek, and
something is signified by that of Isaac, and also by that of Jacob; and
accordingly, if any one, either in an invocation or in swearing an oath, were
to use the expression, “the God of Abraham,” and “the God of Isaac,” and to
their powers, since even demons are vanquished and become submissive to him who
pronounces these names; whereas if we say, “the god of the chosen father of the
echo, and the god of laughter, and the god of him who strikes with the heel,” the
mention of the name is attended with no result, as is the case with other names
possessed of no power. And in the same way, if we translate the word “Israel”
into Greek or any other language, we shall produce no result; but if we retain
it as it is, and join it to those expressions to which such as are skilled in
these matters think it ought to be united, there would then follow some result
from the pronunciation of the word which would accord with the professions of
those who employ such invocations. And we may say the same also of the pronunciation
of “Sabaoth,” a word which is frequently employed in incantations; for if we
translate the term into “Lord of hosts,” or “Lord of armies,” or “Almighty”
(different acceptation of it having been proposed by the interpreters), we
shall accomplish nothing; whereas if we retain the original pronunciation, we
shall, as those who are skilled in such matters maintain, produce some effect. And
the same observation holds good of Adonai. If, then, neither “Sabaoth” nor “Adonai,”
when rendered into what appears to be their meaning in the Greek tongue, can
accomplish anything, how much less would be the result among those who regard
it as a matter of indifference whether the highest being be called Jupiter, or
Zen, or Adonai, or Sabaoth! (Chapter 45)
It was for these and similar mysterious reasons, with which Moses
and the prophets were acquainted, that they forbade the name of other gods to
be pronounced by him who bethought himself of praying to the one Supreme God
alone, or to be remembered by a heart which had been taught to be pure from all
foolish thoughts and words. And for these reasons we should prefer to endure
all manner of suffering rather than acknowledge Jupiter to be God. For we do
not consider Jupiter and Sabaoth to be the same, nor Jupiter to be at all
divine, but that some demon, unfriendly to men and to the true God, rejoices
under this title. And although the Egyptians were to hold Ammon before us under
threat of death, we would rather die than address him as God, it being a name used
in all probability in certain Egyptian incantations in which this demon is
invoked. And although the Scythians may call Pappæus the supreme God, yet we
will not yield our assent to this; granting, indeed, that there is a
Supreme Deity, although we do not give the name Pappæus to Him as His proper
title, but regard it as one which is agreeable to the demon to whom was
allotted th desert of Scythia, with its people and its language. He, however,
who gives God His title in the Scythian tongue, or in the Egyptian or in any
language in which he has been brought up, will not be guilty of sin (Chapter
46).
But neither do the Jews pride themselves upon abstaining from
swine’s flesh, as if it were some great thing; but upon their having
ascertained the nature of clean and unclean animals, and the cause of the
distinction, and of swine being classed among the unclean. And these
distinctions were signs of certain things until the advent of Jesus; after
whose coming it was said to His disciple, who did not yet comprehend the doctrine
concerning these matters, but who said, “Nothing that is common or unclean hath
entered into my mouth,” “What God hath cleansed, call not thou common.” It
therefore in no way affects either the Jews or us that the Egyptian priests
abstain not only from the flesh of swine, but also from that of goats, and
sheep, and oxen, and fish. But since it is not that “which entereth into the
mouth that defiles a man,” and since “meat does not commend us to God,” we do
not set great store on refraining from eating, nor yet are we induced to eat
from a gluttonous appetite. And therefore, so far as we are concerned, the
followers of Pythagoras, who abstain from all things that contain life may do
as they please; only observe the different reason for abstaining from things
that have life on the part of the Pythagoreans and our ascetics. For the former
abstain on account of the fable about the transmigration of souls, as the poet
says:—
“And some one, lifting up his beloved son,
Will slay him after prayer; O how foolish he!”
We, however, when we do abstain, do so because “we keep under our
body, and bring it into subjection,” and desire “to mortify our members that
are upon the earth, fornication, uncleanness, inordinate affection, evil
concupiscence;” and we use every effort to “mortify the deeds of the flesh”
(Chapter 49).
We, however, have to the best of our ability defended ourselves at
great length in the preceding pages on the subject of the honour which we
render to our Jesus, pointing out that we have found the better part; and that
in showing that the truth which is contained in the teaching of Jesus Christ is
pure and unmixed with error, we are not commending ourselves, but our Teacher,
to whom testimony was borne through many witnesses by the Supreme God and the
prophetic writings among the Jews, and by the very clearness of the case
itself, for it is demonstrated that He could not have accomplished such mighty
works without the divine help (Chapter 51).
That we are not refuted, however, on the subject of our great
Saviour, although the accuser may appear to refute us, will be manifest
to those who peruse in a spirit of truth-loving investigation all that is
predicted and recorded of Him. And, in the next place, since he considers that he
makes a concession in saying of the Saviour, “Let him appear to be really an angel,”
we reply that we do not accept of such a concession from Celsus; but we look to
the work of Him who came to visit the whole human race in His word and
teaching, as each one of His adherents was capable of receiving Him. And this
was the work of one who, as the prophecy regarding Him said, was not simply an
angel, but the “Angel of the great counsel:” for He announced to men the great
counsel of the God and Father of all things regarding them, (saying) of those
who yield themselves up to a life of pure religion, that they ascend by means
of their great deeds to God; but of those who do not adhere to Him, that they
place themselves at a distance from God, and journey on to destruction through
their unbelief of Him. He then continues: “If even the angel came to men, is he
the first and only one who came, or did others come on former occasions?” And
he thinks he can meet either of these dilemmas at great length, although there
is not a single real Christian who asserts that Christ was the only being that
visited the human race. For, as Celsus says, “If they should say the only one,”
there are others who appeared to different individuals (Chapter 53).
Proceeding immediately after to mix up and compare with one
another things that are dissimilar, and incapable of being united, he subjoins
to his statement regarding the sixty or seventy angels who came down from
heaven, and who, according to him, shed fountains of warm water for tears, the
following: “It is related also that there came to the tomb of Jesus himself,
according to some, two angels, according to others, one;” having failed to
notice, I think, that Matthew and Mark speak of one, and Luke and John of two,
which statements are not contradictory. For they who mention “one,” say that it
was he who rolled away the stone from the sepulchre; while they who mention “two,”
refer to those who appeared in shining raiment to the women that repaired to
the sepulchre, or who were seen within sitting in white garments. Each of these
occurrences might now be demonstrated to have actually taken place, and to be
indicative of a figurative meaning existing in these “phenomena,” (and
intelligible) to those who were prepared to behold the resurrection of the Word.
Such a task, however, does not belong to our present purpose, but rather to an
exposition of the Gospel (Chapter 56).
If, however, it be necessary to express ourselves with precision
in our answer to Celsus, who thinks that we hold the same opinions on the
matters in question as do the Jews, we would say that we both agree that the
books (of Scripture) were written by the Spirit of God, but that we do not
agree about the meaning of their contents; for we do not regulate our lives
like the Jews, because we are of opinion that the literal acceptation of the
laws is not that which conveys the meaning of the legislation. And we maintain,
that “when Moses is read, the veil is upon their heart,” because the meaning of
the law of Moses has been concealed from those who have not welcomed the way
which is by Jesus Christ. But we know that if one turn to the Lord (for “the
Lord is that Spirit”), the veil being taken away, “he beholds, as in a mirror
with unveiled face, the glory of the Lord” in those thoughts which are
concealed in their literal expression, and to his own glory becomes a participator
of the divine glory; the term “face” being used figuratively for the “understanding,”
as one would call it without a figure, in which is the face of the “inner man,”
filled with light and glory, flowing from the true comprehension of the
contents of the law (Chapter 60).
After the above remarks he proceeds as follows: “Let no one
suppose that I am ignorant that some of them will concede that their God is the
same as that of the Jews, while others will maintain that he is a different
one, to whom the latter is in opposition, and that it was from the former that the
Son came.” Now, if he imagine that the existence of numerous heresies among the
Christians is a ground of accusation against Christianity, why, in a similar
way, should it not be a ground of accusation against philosophy, that the
various sects of philosophers differ from each other, not on small and
indifferent points, but upon those of the highest importance? Nay, medicine
also ought to be a subject of attack, on account of its many conflicting
schools. Let it be admitted, then, that there are amongst us some who deny that
our God is the same as that of the Jews: nevertheless, on that account those
are not to be blamed who prove from the same Scriptures that one and the same
Deity is the God of the Jews and of the Gentiles alike, as Paul, too,
distinctly says, who was a convert from Judaism to Christianity, “I thank my
God, whom I serve from my forefathers with a pure conscience.” And let it be
admitted also, that there is a third class who call certain persons “carnal,”
and others “spiritual,”—I think he here means the followers of Valentinus,—yet
what does this avail against us, who belong to the Church, and who make it an
accusation against such as hold that certain natures are saved, and that others
perish in consequence of their natural constitution? And let it be admitted
further, that there are some who give themselves out as Gnostics, in the same
way as those Epicureans who call themselves philosophers: yet neither will they
who annihilate the doctrine of providence be deemed true philosophers, nor
those true Christians who introduce monstrous inventions, which are disapproved
of by those who are the disciples of Jesus. Let it be admitted, moreover, that
there are some who accept Jesus, and who boast on that account of being
Christians, and yet would regulate their lives, like the Jewish multitude, in accordance with the Jewish law,—and
these are the twofold sect of Ebionites, who either acknowledge with us that
Jesus was born of a virgin, or deny this, and maintain that He was begotten like
other human beings,—what does that avail by way of charge against such as
belong to the Church, and whom Celsus has styled “those of the multitude?” He
adds, also, that certain of the Christians are believers in the Sibyl, having
probably misunderstood some who blamed such as believed in the existence of a
prophetic Sibyl, and termed those who held this belief Sibyllists (Chapter 61).
“Moreover,” he continues, “these persons utter against one another
dreadful blasphemies, saying all manner of things shameful to be spoken; nor
will they yield in the slightest point for the sake of harmony, hating each
other with a perfect hatred.” Now, in answer to this, we have already said that
in philosophy and medicine sects are to be found warring against sects. We,
however, who are followers of the word of Jesus, and have exercised ourselves
in thinking, and saying, and doing what is in harmony with His words, “when
reviled, bless; being persecuted, we suffer it; being defamed, we entreat;” and
we would not utter “all manner of things shameful to be spoken” against
those who have adopted different opinions from ours, but, if possible, use
every exertion to raise them to a better condition through adherence to the
Creator alone, and lead them to perform every act as those who will (one day)
be judged. And if those who hold different opinions will not be convinced, we
observe the injunction laid down for the treatment of such: “A man that is a heretic,
after the first and second admonition, reject, knowing that he that is such is
subverted, and sinneth, being condemned of himself.” Moreover, we who know the
maxim, “Blessed are the peacemakers,” and this also, “Blessed are the meek,”
would not regard with hatred the corrupters of Christianity, nor term those who
had fallen into error Circes and flattering deceivers (Chapter 63).
But since he asserts that “you may hear all those who differ so
widely saying, ‘The world is crucified to me, and I unto the world,’” we shall
show the falsity of such a statement. For there are certain heretical sects
which do not receive the Epistles of the Apostle Paul, as the two sects of Ebionites,
and those who are termed Encratites. Those, then, who do not regard the apostle
as a holy and wise man, will not adopt his language, and say, “The world is
crucified to me, and I unto the world.” And consequently in this point, too,
Celsus is guilty of falsehood. He continues, moreover, to linger over the
accusations which he brings against the diversity of sects which exist, but does
not appear to me to be accurate in the language which he employs, nor to have
carefully observed or understood how it is that those Christians who have made
progress in their studies say that they are possessed of greater knowledge than
the Jews; and also, whether they acknowledge the same Scriptures, but interpret
them differently, or whether they do not recognise these books as divine. For
we find both of these views prevailing among the sects. He then continues: “Although
they have no foundation for the doctrine, let us examine the system itself;
and, in the first place, let us mention the corruptions which they have made
through ignorance and misunderstanding, when in the discussion of elementary
principles they express their opinions in the most absurd manner on things
which they do not understand, such as the following.” And then, to certain expressions
which are continually in the mouths of the believers in Christianity, he
opposes certain others from the writings of the philosophers, with the object
of making it appear that the noble sentiments which Celsus supposes to be used
by Christians have been expressed in better and clearer language by the
philosophers, in order that he might drag away to the study of philosophy those
who are caught by opinions which at once evidence their noble and religious
character. We shall, however, here terminate the fifth book, and begin the
sixth with what follows (Chapter 65).
